DIRECTORS' DISCRETION IN CORPORATE ACTS.

1163

DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF.

ANGELO T. FREEDLEY, ESQ.,
Assisted by

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF,

LEwis LAWRENCE SMITH,

H. B.

MAURICE G. BELxNAP,

ELLERMAN

V.

SCHERMERHORN.

CHICAGO JUNCTION RAILWAYS AND UNION

NEW JERSEY
STOCKYARDS CO. ET AL.'
COURT OF CHANCERY.
Directors' Discretion in Corporate Acts-Right of Stockholder to

Question.
Where a bill was brought against the Chicago Junction Railways
and Union Stockyards Company by the stockholders of the same, to enjoin the compan.y from carrying into effect a certain agreement deemed
by the stockholders to be beyond the authority of the directors thereof,
held, that individual stockholders could not question, in judicial proceedings, the Iborporate acts of directors, if the same are within the
powers of the corporation, and in furtherance of its purposes, are not
unlawful or against good morals, and are done in good faith and'in the
exercise of an honest judgment:
Decided December 18, 1892.
TIlE RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO CONTROL THE DIscRETION OF
DIREcToRs IN CORPORATE AcTs.
their powers arewithout limitation
As a general rule the courts will
presume that contracts entered into and free from restraint. Any other
view would substitute the judgby a corporation, which appear to
be designed to promote its legiti- ment and discretion of others in
mate and profitable operation, are the place of those determined on
within the limits of its powers, and in the formation of the corporation: Park v. Grant Locomotive
if their validity be assailed, will
Works, 40 N.J. Eq., 114; 10 Am.
require the assailant to assume the
& Eng. Corp. Cas., affirmed, 45 N.
burden of demonstrating that fact.
Questions of policy, of manage- J. Eq., 244; Elkins v. Camden &
A. R. R. Co., .36N.J. Eq;, 241; 1;
ment, of expediency, of contracts
or action, of adequacy of consider- Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 579; Rutation not grossly disproportionate,
land & B. R. Co. v. Proctor, 29 Vt.,
93; Mor. Priv. Corp., 243; Beach,
of lawful appropriation of corpoCorp., p. 388.
rate funds to advance corporate
interests-are left solely to the honIn his opinion in the case of .Elest decision of the directors, if lerman v. Chicago J. R. & U. S.
I Reported in 49 N. J. Eq., 217.
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V. C., says: "The
Co., GR.UE,
question of. adequacy df the consideration received by the company
for what it. agreed to pay is one
which is not open to the plaintiff.
So long as the consideration was
valuable, and not so inadequate as
to impute fraud, the amount to be
paid -was in the discretion of the
board of directors, and will not be
inquired into by the court. ....
The terms of the contract and the
consideration having, then, been
settled by the directors, on what
ground is it attacked? There is
no intimation of fraud. No improvidence is alleged; no extravagance; no absence of occasion
moving such a contract; no allegation. of haste or of mistake of
facts. Nothing is alleged but error
of law on the part of the directors
who unanimously approved the
agreement."
Chancellor GaEEN then goes on
to show that the legal presumption
is in favor of the agreement, and
that the burden lies upon the complainant to demonstrate that the
agreement was beyond the corporate powers, and to show how and
where the legal restraint arises or
was imposed which rendered the
contract ultra vires. See Wood on
Railway Law, p. 526; also Shrewsbury, etc. R. Co. v. Northwestern
R. Co., H. L. Cas., 113. ,
After a further examination into
the nature of the proposed agreement, and into the powers with
which the corporation was invested
by its charter, Chancellor GREEN
concludes: "In my opinion the
covenants entered into by the company in this contract are "referable
to the objects stated in their certificate of corporation, or to powers
incident to the corporation, and are
. .
authorized by its charter.

And I advise that the bill be dis"
missed with costs."
In such, cases the court will not
interfere unless, as JAMES, L. J.,
said, in Macdougall v. Gardiner,
L. R., I Ch. Div., 13, "there be
something illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent-unless there is something ultra vires on the part of the
company qud company, or on the
part of the majority of the company, so that they are not fit persons to determine it." InDodge v.,
Woolsey, iS How. (U. S.), 331,
where the directors of a bank refused to take the proper measures
to resist the collection of a tax,
which they themselves believed to
have been imposed-upon them in
violation of their charter, this refusal amounted to a breach of trust,
and a stockholder-was held competent to file abill in chancery asking
such remedy as the case might
require.
The directors of a corporation
are, however, as to all purposed of
dealing with others, the corporation itself, and when convened as a
board they are the primary possessors of all the powers possessed by
the corporation. What they do as
the representatives of the corporation the corporation itselfis deemed
to do: Hoyt v. Thompson, i N.Y.,
207; Burrill v. Nehant Bank, 2
Metc. (Mass.), 163; Star Line v.
Van Vliet, 43 Mich., 364; Genessee
Say. Bank v. Michigan Barge Co.
52 Mich., 438; 6 Amer. & Eng. Corp.
Cas., 253; Cleveland & M. R. Co.
v. Himrod Furnace Co., 37 Ohio
St., 321.

It follows from this that the
stockholders of a corporation have
no right to control or interfere with
the management of the business
and the concerns of the company
by the directors. The authority of
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cause of action. The Court said:
the board of directors is derived
from the unanimous agreement of "The corporation's charterempowers it to make purchases of land, to
the stockholders expressed in their
contract debts, and to issue bonds
charter or articles of association,
to a certain amount; and if these
and hence these powers which it is
intended shall belong to the direc- powers are so exercised as to result
tors exclusively, cannot be impaired in loss to the stockholders, it is
a misfortune against which the
by the shareholders: Tuscaloosa
courts can afford no protection."
Manufacturing Co. v. Cox, 68 Ala.,
See, also, Boyd v. Sims, 87 Tenn.,
71; Perry v. Tuscaloosa Cotton Seed
771; Ogelsby v. Attril, 1o5 U. S.Oil Mill Co. (Ala.), 33 Am. & Eng.
605; Banet v. Alton & S. R. Co., 13
Corp. Cas., 346; Sims v. Brooklyn
Ill., 5o4; Bardstown & G. R. TurnStreet R. Co., 37 Ohio St., 556;
pike Co. v. Rodman (Ky.), 13 S.W.
Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn , 446.
Rep., 918.
This is well settled, therefore,
that the board of directors of a corThe rule that the court will not
poration cannot be controlled in interfere in questions of expedithe exercise of the discretionary ency or economy has been applied
powers conferred upon them; the in actions by stockholders to precourts will not interfere at tlje suit vent the directors of a manufacturof a shareholder to redress an al- ing corporation from using a large
leged injury suffered by the corpo- surplus for the erection of an addiration through some act of the tional factory, andto compel them to
directors, performed in good faith,
distribute it among the stockholdand within the scope of their powers: Pratt v. Pratt, Read & Co., 33
Conn., 446 ; to an action to set aside
ers. All questions of expediehcy
and economy, within the limits of certain subscriptions for a portion
their powers, must be left to the of the authorized capital of the comfree exercise of their judgment, and
pany taken by the directors: Sims
remedy cannot be had by applicav. Brooklyn Street R. Co., 37 Ohio
tion to the courts.
St., 556; 4 Am. and Eng. R. Cas.,
In Dudley v. Kentucky High
132; and to an action by stockSchool, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 576, the cor- holders of a railroad company to
poration was authorized by its char- prevent the extension of the railter "to receive and hold for the
road, and to prevent the directors
benefit of a high school any lands, from using the corporate assets
by gift, devise, donation, contract,
therefor: Moses v. Thompkins, 84
or purchase."
A stockholder
Ala., 613; 21 Am. and Eng. Corp.
brought suit to enjoin a contem- Cas., 634.
plated purchase of real estate, setThe courts will not inquire as to
ting out that the corporation was the wisdom ofan assessment, or its
unable to pay the contemplated
necessity at the time, or the moprice, and that the result of the tives which prompted it, if it be
purchase, if consummated, would .within the legitimate authority of
be the bankruptcy of the corpora- the directors to levy it, and the obtion, but did not allege that the jects for which the company waz
lands were not to be held for the incorporated will justify the exbenefit of the school. It was held penditure of the money to be raised.
that the petition did not show a
Directors of a turnpike company,
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being authorized by statute to re- cise of its discretion in that matter,
move any.of the gates'oof the com- in the absence of an improper or
pany when it will be for the interest
corrupt motive: State v. Bank of
of the road, cannot, as long as they La., 6 La., 745.
* act. in good faith, be restrained at
In Small v. Minneapolis Electro
thle suit of the stockholders from
Matrix Co., 45 Minn., 264, the
,exercisingtbis power and the power
Court said: "In the absence of exto sell the abandoned toll houses:
press provision to the contrary, it
Bardstown & G. R. T. Co. v. Rod- is to be considered as the law conman (Ky.), i 3 S. W. Rep., 917.
cerning business corporations that
their affairs are to be managed in
On account of the vast increase in
the number of corporations and the the interest of their stockholders,
purposes-for which they are fdrmed
and by directors or agents apin this country, and the' necessity pointed by them. This is to be
for the exercise by their officers
taken to be implied in the contract
arid managing boards of wide dis- unless in some manner a different
cretionary powers, courts of the intentionis expressed."
As to the right to impair the
present period incline to deal with
them very liberally, both in condiscretionary power of directors,
struing their express, and in grant- Morawetz says, in
243: "The
managing agents of ordinary priing their implied, authority. In
oing so, they have to a certain ex- vate corporations are invested with
tent relaxed the former rule on
wide discretionary powers; if this
this subject. At an earlier period. were not so it would be impossible
they were reluctant to concede to carry on the business of such
powers to the directors beyond a, companies successfully. So long
as the agents of a company act
strict construction of the charter
honestly within the powers conand by-laws: Whitewell v. Baruer,
ferred upon them by the charter,
20 Vt., 425; see also, Augusta
they cannot be controlled. The
Bank v. Hamblett, 35 Me., 491;
individual shareholders have no
Dispatch Line, etc., 'v. 'Bellamy
Mfg. Co., 12 N. H., 225.
authority to dictate to the comWhen acting as a board within pany's agents what policy they
the scope of their authority, how- shall pursue, or to impair that disever conferred, their acts are bind- cretion which was conferred upon
ing on the corporation, and all its
them by the charter. If- sharelegitimate business may be trans- holders are dissatisfied with their
acted-by them without the express
agents, whom they have elected,
sanction of the stockholders. The their remedy is to elect other
latter have no right to interfere agents. It would be a violation of
with management by the board.
the charter contract and a wrong
Courts will not, even on the peti- to every dissenting member to pertion of a majority, compel the mit any portion of the shareholders
to interfere with the discretionary
directors to do an act contrary to
their judgment. It is within the powers which were intrusted to the
province of the board to declare agents of the corporation alone.
dividends, for example, and it re"It may, therefore, be stated as a
quires a strong case to -induce rule that no shareholder can intercourts to interfere with the exer- fere with the management of the

